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Resumo:  Como  ocorre  a  tradução  de  ideias e  conceitos  do  pensamento  religioso  em 
concepções antropológicas e políticas? Se a emergência do monoteísmo cristão no mundo 
ocidental  compreendeu  a  unidade  do  humano através  da  singularidade  da  concepção de 
Deus, agora qualquer pluralidade da expressão religiosa pode ser apreendida ao compreender 
essa pluralidade através da unidade da concepção (sem conteúdo) do ser humano. Este artigo 
rastreia  alguns  modos  seminais  destas  traduções  do  religioso  para  o  laico  nas  suas 
articulações de Kant e Hegel a Marx e Heidegger, passando pela poesia de Píndaro.
Palavras-Chave: Píndaro; Homero; Tradução. 
Abstract:  How  can  ideas  and  concepts  of  religious  thought  be  translated  into 
anthropological  and  political  conceptions?  Whereas  in  the  emergence  of  ‘Christian 
monotheism’ in the West the unity of humanity was once grasped through the singularity of 
the conception of God, now any plurality of religious expression is able to be countenanced 
by grasping that plurality through the unity of the (contentless) conception of the human 
being. This article follows a few seminal modes of such translations in their articulations  
from Kant and Hegel to Marx and Heidegger, with an excursion to Pindar's poetry.
Key-words: Pindar; Homer; Translation. 
The modern understanding of humanity: humanity is above all the  productive and 
creative species. Every contemporary course in education, every advance of human 
life,  every advertisement for human consumption, promises to enhance our, your, 
their, productivity and creativity, or is related to this promise in some way.
In the thought of Karl Marx, so dependent on the dialectical thought of Hegel, 
‘man’ is that one who at one and the same time is utterly the production and creation 
of history, and the one who produces and creates the historical conditions for his 
succession.   Marx  is  explicit  in  this  when  he  says:  “History  is  nothing  but  the 
succession  of  the  separate  generations,  of  which  each  exploits  materials,  capital 
Philia&Filia, Porto Alegre, vol. 02, n° 1, jan./jul. 2013
A Tradução Poética em Múltiplas Dimensões
44
______
The Rule for the 
Best: The End of  
Anthropology
Laurence Paul 
Hemming
ISSN 2178-1737
funds, forces of production, handed down to it by all preceding generations, hence, 
on  the  one  hand,  continuing  the  traditional  activity  in  completely  changed 
circumstances and, on the other, modifies the old circumstances with a completely 
changed activity”.1
The  thought  that  Marx  expresses  here  lies  at  the  very  basis,  not  only  of 
Marxism, but every contemporary form of the understanding of society.  Above all 
contemporary  capitalism,  let  alone  the  dried-out  husk  of  the  twentieth  century’s 
terrifying experiments with communism and fascism, measures its success or failure 
(a success or failure much in the balance at this present time), on the basis of its 
ability  to  create  or  destroy  value.   It  is  not  accidental  that  Marx  takes  up  the 
terminology  of  religion  in  the  working-out  of  his  thinking,  especially  when  he 
expresses his estimation of the ‘idea’ as ‘lord’, and in doing so  characterises the 
creativity that hitherto was said to belong to the God of the Book of Genesis, to 
describe the activity of the production of value (capital) as such.2
From the outset the posing of the question of the ‘they’, of humanity as a 
multitude  and ‘as  a  whole’  (‘man’,  humanity,  ‘the human person’,  etc.),  poses  a 
political question.  Every theory of political life that confronts us in the present age is 
grounded in an anthropology, that is to say, who ‘man’ is in general, what ‘he’ is to 
become, what the ground and possibility for his freedom is, and where he is to go. 
‘He’ (for which you must also read ‘she’), has, or ought to have, a vote.  In the 
1
 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Der deutsche Ideologie: Kritik der neusten deutschen Philosophie  
in ihren Repräsentanten Feuerbach, B. Bauer und Stirner, und des deutschen Sozialismus in seinen  
verschiedenen Propheten (1932 [1845–46])in Marx Engels Werke, Berlin, Dietz Verlag, 1990 (1958), 
vol. 3, p. 45.  “Die Geschichte ist nichts als die Aufeinanderfolge der einzelnen Generationen, von 
denen Jede die ihr von allen vorhergegangenen übermachten Materiale, Kapitalien, Produktionskräfte 
exploitiert,  daher  also  einerseits  unter  ganz  veränderten  Umständen  die  überkommene  Tätigkeit 
fortsetzt und andrerseits mit einer ganz veränderten Tätigkeit die alten Umstände modifiziert.”  The 
original German is more in note form: my translation has been modified for the sake of flow, without 
alteration of the underlying sense.
2
 Karl Marx, Grundrisse der Kritik der politischen Ökonomie in Marx Engels Werke (MEW), Berlin, 
Dietz  Verlag,  2005 (1983,  1939–1941),  vol.  42:  p.  97.   “Die  Individuen nun von  Abstraktionen 
beherrscht werden, während sie früher voneinander abhingen.  Die Abstraktion oder Idee ist aber 
nichts  als  das  theoretische  Ausdruck  jener  materiellen  Verhältnisse,  die  Herr  über  sie  sind.” 
(“Individuals are now ruled by  abstractions,  whereas earlier they depended on one another.   The 
abstraction  or  idea  is,  however,  nothing  other  than  the  theoretical  expression  of  those  material 
relations  which  rule  over  them.”);  p.  243.  “Und  die  Vermehrung  der  Werte  kann  nur  dadurch 
stattfinden, daß ein Wert über das Äquivalent hinaus erhalten, also geschaffen wird” (“the increase of 
values can therefore take place,  only if  a value over the equivalent is obtained, thus is  created”). 
(Marx’s italics) 
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exercise of the democratic vote is secured the identity of every man, or woman, with 
every other.   More than anything else,  democratic politics  already presupposes a 
distinct and very specific anthropology, for whom the question of God and the gods, 
of ‘religion’, and its freedom, is a constant antagonism.
The  essence  of  the  contemporary  anthropology  is  atheistic,  exactly  what 
Marx  names  in  seeking  to  take  over  the  language  of  religion  for  the  sake  of 
explaining  the  existence  of  the  human  production  of  history  and  society  itself. 
Nowhere is this more manifest than in contemporary liberal democracy.  If we take 
one of the foremost exponents of the theory of the state in relation to religion, Martha 
Nussbaum, we find her saying from the outset “all modern democracies are currently 
in a state of fear, and growing religious diversity is one of the things that most keenly 
inspires fear”.3  Nussbaum’s thesis is that “liberty of conscience is incompatible with 
any type of religious establishment”.  Is this true of the situation in the United States? 
Nussbaum is concerned that the (Federal, American) state itself be free to guarantee 
liberty of conscience, a pattern for liberty of religious belief anywhere else (a pattern 
of liberal religious freedom).  This freedom necessitates that the state already be 
freed from any religious involvement of its own.  Let me answer my initial question 
(‘is this true of the situation . . . ?’) by summarising her basic thesis with a quote:  
“North America is the land of religiosity par excellence . . . the state emancipates 
itself from religion by emancipating itself from the  state religion . . . therefore the 
state  can have emancipated itself from religion even if the  overwhelming majority  
still considered themselves obliged to fulfil their religious duties . . . Therefore the 
state can have emancipated itself from religion even if the overwhelming majority is 
still religious.  And the overwhelming majority does not cease to be religious by 
being religious in private.”  This is a good summary of Nussbaum’s thesis developed 
in several places on this question, applicable above all to the American situation. 
Yet I quote not her, but a text written in1843 and published the following year, by, in 
fact, Karl Marx.4 Marx repeats (self-consciously) an essential position of Hegel, but 
one which was imposed in anything but theoretical ways on every part of the Europe 
3
 Martha C. Nussbaum,  Liberty of Conscience: The Attack on Equal Respect in  Journal of Human 
Development, vol. 8 (2007), p. 339.  The ideas Nussbaum advances here are essentially a summary of  
her book Marta C. Nussbaum, Liberty of Conscience: In Defense of America’s Tradition of Religious  
Equality, Philadelphia, Basic Books, 2008.
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which had been occupied by, and whose future constitution was in some part at least 
conditioned by, Napoleon.  At the same time what this quote encapsulates lies at the 
basis of the Constitution of the United States of America.  This understanding, that 
religion is to be practised in private and so has no place in the public sphere, formed 
the essence of Napoleon’s enforced ‘concordat’ with Pope Pius VI of 1801, which 
ushered  in  the  religious  settlement  of  modern,  ‘democratic’  Europe.5  In  this 
(religious)  sense  Europe  merely  caught  up  to  where  the  revolution  of  1776 had 
begun.
An anthropology, which describes the essence of the being of being human, 
what each man or women is with respect to themselves, and so which assumes the 
essential  equality  of  all  men  and  women  before  the  law  and  within  the  state, 
necessarily produces, and is secured on the basis of, a very specific politics.  At the 
same time that politics shows how, concealed in the essence of every anthropology, 
there is an attempt to reserve an understanding of the human being to a place apart 
from the determinations and effects of any understanding of divinity. Even for the 
religious  anthropologist  (who,  if  he  has  one,  fulfils  his  religion  in  private), 
anthropology is essentially atheistic.  And here I might just disappoint you.  I am not 
proposing an ‘alternative’; I do not have ‘the solution’; I am not going to introduce 
you  to  a  ‘better  anthropology’;  –  all  these  are  the  temptations  of  the  modern 
instrumentalising mind (a vice to which academics are especially given).  Above all, 
this argument is not really about religious freedom (or even religion) at all, even as it 
begins there.  I merely want to draw your attention to an inherent danger in every 
transition from its to they.
What  is  the  ordinary  procedure  of  anthropology?   Anthropology  speaks 
initially of a unity, ‘man’, ‘the human person’, such that the nature of being itself is 
to know and to be known through an original unity.  On the other hand, man’s nature  
4
 Karl Marx, Zur Judenfrage (1843) in Marx Engels Werke (MEW), Berlin, Dietz Verlag, 2006 (1981, 
1927), vol. 1, p. 352–353.  “Dennoch ist Nordamerika vorzugsweise das Land der Religiosität . . . als  
Staat  emanzipiert  sich  der  Staat  von  der  Religion,  indem  er  sich  von  der  Staatsreligion 
emanzipiert  .  .  .  Der  Staat  kann  sich  also  von der  Religion  emanzipiert  haben,  sogar  wenn  die  
überwiegende Mehrzahl  noch religiös ist. Und die überwiegende Mehrzahl hört dadurch nicht auf, 
religiös zu sein, daß sie privatim religiös ist.
5
 The Concordat said, not (as the pope had demanded) that ‘Catholicism is the religion of France’, but 
rather, ‘Catholicism is the religion of the majority of Frenchmen’.  In other words, an entirely private 
matter, which for the individual could a matter of choice.
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is absolute openness for all being, ‘being as a whole’, ‘in its essence’, or, to put it in 
one (idealist) word, man is as much Geist as he is matter.  This is the very ground of 
a metaphysical anthropology.
I  am  interested  in  nothing  other  than  the  order  of  procedure here. 
Anthropology proceeds from the establishment of the  essence or being of man  as 
such, to being in general. This is how anthropology proceeds, in order to establish its  
universal ‘humanity’. The entanglement with religious freedom that I have already 
drawn attention to merely indicates an unfolding and a transformation in the way in 
which  this  whole  is  grasped.   For  whereas  in  the  emergence  of  ‘Christian 
monotheism’  in  the  West  the  unity  of  humanity  was  once  grasped  through the 
singularity of the conception of God (which had political consequences),  now any 
plurality of religious expression is able to be countenanced by grasping that plurality 
through the unity of the conception of the human being. Conception means merely 
‘that thought which goes in advance of every thought’: at one time the singularity of 
the subjectivity of that which underpins (the ‘sub-iectum’) all things – ‘God’: now 
‘humanity’,  ‘man’.6  In  this  sense  Anthropology  is  entirely  consistent  with  its 
Kantian  origins,  Kant  who  says  (in  entire  conformity  with  Descartes’  argument 
cogito, ergo sum), “the: ‘I think’ must be able to accompany all my representations”.7 
The unity of  the  self,  and its  prior existence,  is  pre-posited in  every subsequent 
thought of anything else I think. This is the strict basis for any anthropology at all. 
Before this prior identity and unity is secured, nothing like an anthropology existed 
thematically in thought, either theological or philosophical. Which is why we have to 
read back into Augustine, Aristotle, Plato, and every pre-Enlightenment thinker the 
6
 It is in precisely this sense that Marx grasps the very radicality of Hegel’s politics, when he says that  
from henceforth “the critique of heaven transforms itself into the critique of the earth, the critique of  
religion into the  critique of right, the  critique of theology into the  critique of politics.”  Karl Marx, 
Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie (MEW1), p. 379.  “Die Kritik des Himmels verwandelt 
sich damit in die Kritik der Erde, die  Kritik der Religion in die  Kritik des Rechts,  die  Kritik der 
Theologie in die  Kritik der Politik.”  (Marx’s emphases)  Martin Heidegger noted repeatedly how, 
after  the  Enlightenment,  and  particularly  in  the  modern  period,  all  theology,  no  matter  how 
‘orthodox’  had  become  anthropology,  on  this  very  basis.   It  is  unsurprising  then,  that  the 
unimpeachably Catholic and Jesuit theologian Karl Rahner sets out his theological enterprise on the 
basis of an anthropological  formulation.  Karl  Rahner,  Hörer  des Wortes:  Zur Grundlegung einer 
Religionsphilosophie, Munich, Kösel-Pustet, 1941, pp. 24–25, 59 ff.
7
 Immanuel Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Frankfurt, Suhrkamp, 1974 (1787), p. 136, B 131.  “Das: 
Ich Denke, muß alle meine Vorstellungen begleiten können.” 
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anthropology that we argue is implicit in them, even if they never actually secured it 
for themselves. 
And yet this unity of the thinking self, given in advance of, and as the basis 
of, every thought, indicates the very basis of contemporary politics. For the subject 
as the ‘nature’ or essence of man in general, is contentless; this subjectivity (as pure, 
mere, possibility) is secured in advance of every thought: it is the persistent presence 
of self-presence to self.  As this, it is how the essence, the being, of man as such is 
secured  through  a  kind  of  constant  re-presenting,  constant  presence.  But  this 
subjectivity is the constantly-secured, as an ‘in advance’, each time a thought is had. 
Thus  every  particular  thought,  every  ‘experience’  is  secured  in  advance  by  the 
‘essence’ of man as a contentless ‘I think’ that goes constantly in advance of the 
world, and has had the world explicitly wiped off it (this is what the method of doubt 
has secured for us, and so ‘is’), and yet guarantees how world, being itself, is to be 
thought. Being-in-general is secured by means of this-being, which is the contentless 
identity of every being (man or woman) with every other. Identity, as sameness. This 
contentless subject that is in advance of everything else that is, even world as such, is 
metaphysically equal to every other subject: every difference, and so difference as 
such, is a super-addition, something that is added on after the fact: be it place, time, 
ethnicity, colour, religion, education, class, history, occupation, condition, pathology; 
whatever ‘category’ you work in anthropologically.  This is even the basis for so-
called  gender-realignment  surgery,  since  even  the  sex  of  a  subject  is,  strictly 
speaking, a super-addition to the nature of it  as subject. This is the metaphysical 
equality of the possession of the right to vote. In the vote, in democracies at least, 
every difference is levelled-off to a metaphysical sameness and identity at the point 
of the ballot-box.
To pursue this point further it will become necessary to ask all over again, 
what  do  we  mean  by  this  word,  anthropology?   From  whence  does  it  come? 
Anthropology: that which speaks of the  ἄνθρωπος, of man as such, or, if we are 
more  careful  with  our  language,  ‘the  human  being’:  as  such,  in  general. 
Anthropology speaks of what is common to every human being: that it is, as what it 
is. The sixth century BC Greek Lyric poet, of all the lyricists, perhaps the greatest, 
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Pindar, ends his eighth Pythian Ode with six of the most beautiful lines of his genre. 
They read:
ἐπάμεροι · τί δέ τις; τί δ᾽ οὔ τις; σκιᾶς ὄναρ
ἄνθρωπος.  ἀλλ᾽ ὅταν αἴγλα διόσδοτος ἔλθῃ,
λαμπὸν φέγγος ἔπεστιν ἀνδρῶν καὶ μειλίχος αἰών.
Αἴγινα φίλα μᾶτερ, ἐλευθέρῳ στόλῳ
πόλιν τάνδε κόμιζε Δὶ καὶ κρέοντι σὺν Αἰακῷ
Πηλεῖ τε κἀγαθῷ Τελαμῶνι σὐν τ᾽ Ἀχιλλεῖ.8
The Eighth Pythian Ode is one of the epinician, or victory, odes, those that celebrate 
the victories of the games, said to have been composed in Pindar’s seventy-sixth 
year.9  These lines are among the best known in Pindar, celebrating the victory of 
Aristomenes  at  the  Pythian  games  at  Delphi,  and  Aristomenes’  homecoming  to 
Aegina.   Aristomenes’  name means  (roughly)  ‘Best  in  Courage  (on  the  field  of 
trial)’. The ode meditates in alternate strophes on how fame and ignominy befalls 
mortals, and how even the fame of mortals is fleeting – the suggestion is, especially 
after death. A commonly offered translation runs:
Creatures of a day!  What is a man?  What is he not?  A
dream of a shadow
is man.  But whenever Zeus-given brightness comes,
a shining light rests upon men, and a gentle life.
Dear mother Aegina, on its voyage of freedom
safeguard this city, together with Zeus and king Aiak s,ō
Peleus and noble Telamon, and with Achilles.10
8
 Pindar, Pythian 8, l. 95–100.
9
 The date generally accepted for this Ode is 446.  See R. W. B. Burton,  Pindar’s Pythian Odes, 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1962, p. 174.
10
 Pindar,  ed.  and  trans.  William  H.  Race,  Pindar:  Olympian  Odes;  Pythian  Odes,  Cambridge, 
Harvard University Press (Loeb Classical Library), 1997, p. 333, incl. note 3.
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The strophe begins with a plural: ἐπάμεροι, literally, οι, ones with respect to, given 
over to, the ἡμέρα, the day.  The Greeks know nothing of men as a creation.  The 
notion of the day here is not, as we seek to hear it, ephemera, men and women as the 
marginalia of events, but rather the opposite is at issue.  Ἐπ᾽ ἡμέρα, with respect to – 
concerning – the day, is that in which something is to be decided, namely the day as 
such: the day, we might say, of reckoning, the day which sets the measure of all other 
days. The plural says: for each of you, the day decides and there is a decisive day! 
The day in question in the ode is the day of Aristomenes’ victory in the wrestling. 
We might say, each of us has and will have his or her day. What kind of a day? For a 
day is the counterpoint to a life: in the day, in its vicissitudes, is how we live out the 
life that we have. To be in the day, and to be decided  by the day, is what is most 
common to each of us, and marks us out from the gods, who have no day as such, but 
are ἀεί.  Ἀεἰ does not only mean ‘ever’, it can also mean ‘now’, the moment: but the 
word brings to the fore the presencing moment, that which presents itself and is, in a 
sense, present as a demand. We experience this demand as a constancy, as persisting, 
as  what  will  never  leave us  and so persists  unchanged:  we see  at  once how the 
contemporary  understanding  of  subjectivity  of  the  subject,  of  self  as  constant-
presence, usurps the time of the gods (sending them into flight)  and destroys the 
relation  to  the  day.  This  word,  ἐπάμεροι,  says:  ‘mortals’;  ones  who  must  arise 
through a birth; who live out our days by living in them, and speak out from the day, 
and die. We are those ones whom the day befalls (the proper meaning of the prefix, 
ἐπί), and are shaped and apportioned by the day as it falls upon us.11 Mortals are at 
the mercy of the day that befalls them. And it is only if we read the opening in this 
way that we can understand what is at issue in the enigmatic phrase
τί δέ τις; τί δ᾽ οὔ τις; 
11
 See  Hermann  Fränkel,  Man’s  ‘Ephemeros’:  Nature  According  to  Pindar  and  Others in 
Transactions  and Proceedings  of  the  American  Philological  Association, vol.  77  (1946),  p.  133. 
Fränkel notes (p. 133) “And the other element,  ἐπί, indicates that ‘day’ is ‘upon’ us.  Just as, for 
instance, ἐπίφθονος, is ‘exposed and subject to envy’, so ἐφήμερος is ‘exposed and subject to every 
actuality as it arises’, and the term implies that man is moulded and remoulded by changing events  
and circumstances.  For, according to this remarkable view, it is not merely our external condition that  
is liable to abrupt vicissitudes: we are ἐφἠμεροι ourselves; our thoughts and feelings, our attitude and 
behaviour, our ways and actions – in short, our entire personality is shifting and at the mercy of the 
day.”
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There appear to be two questions here: each asks ‘what?’, Greek τί; . We who live 
from philosophy live from out of this question ‘what?’. The founding question of 
Plato,  of Aristotle,  of the whole tradition and history of philosophy is:  τί τὸ ὄν; 
,‘what is the (present, extant) being (in its being)?’; what is this  thing which is the 
object of our enquiry? To find out the whatness in every thing is the discovery of its 
essence, what is at the same time essential to it and definitive for its being – what 
persists when everything else is stripped away. This ; τί , its whatness, drives in to the 
demand  that  presence  is,  to  name  it  and  find  it  out.  Except  that  Pindar  is  no 
philosopher, and it is for precisely this reason that I make a thoughtful appeal to 
these lines of this ode. For he asks his question, if indeed it even is a question, before 
the  philosophising  of  Aristotle  and  Plato.   Counterpoint  in  Greek  is  ordinarily 
indicated by the parallel μέν . . . δέ: ‘on the one hand, on the other’. Here, however, 
we have the succession,  δέ,  δέ: the essential thought is not ‘or’, but ‘and . . . and 
then’. The construction which we translated as ‘What is a man?  What is he not?’ is  
not a contrast, but names the same in two forms: that it is (τί δέ τις); that it is not (τί 
δ᾽ οὔ τις). In Greek the τί is unclear: for it could say ‘what?’, or it could say ‘who?’. 
Τί δέ τις; has the perfectly ordinary sense of ‘who indeed?’: indeed, what is said here 
need not be a question. We do not know: Greek gained its diacritics and punctuation 
only in the first century AD, in a form that only became common in the fourth: in 
other words, between near seven and a full ten centuries elapse before Pindar’s line is 
marked and punctuated, by which time its meaning is decided by many and various 
interpretations (setting aside the later  complications  of  different  punctuations and 
forms, that confuse the issue further). What is indicated here as the continuation of 
the  same,  both that  he is  (who indeed!)  and that  he indeed is  not  (τί δ᾽ οὔ τις), 
indicates not ‘what?’, but when. The day befalls a man when he indeed is, but that  
day will also fall out (for him) when he is not.12
12
 Charles  Segal  (Pindar,  Mimnermus,  and  the  ‘Zeus-Given  Gleam’:  The  End  of  Pythian  8 in 
Quaderni Urbinati di Cultura Classica, vol. 22 [1976], pp. 71–76) argues that there is a parallelism 
between this line of Pindar and the first line of Mimnermus’ Fragment 1: τίς δὲ βίος,  τί δὲ τερπνὸν 
ἄτερ χρυσέμε Ἀφροδίτης; (‘What of a life, what delight without golden Aphrodite?’).  The parallel, 
even if there (and something of Mimnermus does sometimes haunt Pindar’s lines), seems shadowy, 
and if meant at all, should be understood as no more than a distant allusion.
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Little can convey in English the sense both of assertion, ‘who indeed!’ and its 
dissipation ‘who, that he is not’ of the succession in this line, which is followed by 
the phrase, difficult to translate –  σκιᾶς ὄναρ – a shadow,  σκιᾶς, of a dream. The 
word ὄναρ, as many (but not all) commentators on this text have argued must be read 
as  a  subjective  genitive;  a  shadow,  literally,  remembered or  possessed  of  (by)  a 
dream.13 Whose is the shadow in question? The word σκιά occurs in Homer, at the 
moment where Odysseus learns of his need to descend to the house of Hades, there 
where alone has Persephone been granted νόος, the openness of understanding. The 
word Homer uses of each of those at Hades is ψυχή, the word we ordinarily use for 
soul.14 Only Persephone has  understanding and knowledge in  Hades  itself:  every 
other soul of the dead is in an entirely different condition. With the exception of 
Persephone, Homer describes the souls in Hades thus:  τοὶ δὲ σκιαὶ ἀίσσουσιν: the 
others,  these  shades  (who  are  also  souls),  flutter  about,  without  understanding, 
unknowingly.15 To have  understanding (νοῦς)  means:  to  be  ready for  world  and 
whatever befalls us through our being in the world and being worlded. Persephone, 
daughter  of  Demeter  (mother  of  the  earth)  is  that  one  who,  belonging to  Hades 
because she had been tricked into eating in his house, must return from the world to 
the underworld for a season of every year.16 To have openness for world, νοῦς, is to 
be ordered to the day, to the change it brings, and so to be subject to what the day 
decides.  This  is  the  opposite  of  ‘constant-(unchanging)-presence  (as  presence-to-
self)’, the state of mortals in death. To have νοῦς is to be able to open the mouth for 
speech, λόγος, which means to be able to denote and know, and speak of, world. To 
be  without  openness for the world, understanding,  νοῦς, means: to be thrown back 
endlessly on myself, to become unchanging, the constant self-presence that is given 
only in the underworld, in death. To be thrown back endlessly means: to live only in 
13
 See L. Bieler, ΣΚΙΑΣ ΟΝΑΡ ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΣ SKIAS in Wiener Studien, vol. 53, 1933, pp. 143–145; 
see  also Peter  Toohey,  Shades  of  Meaning in  Pindar Pythian 8,  95–97 in  Quaderni  Urbinati  di  
Cultura Classica, vol. 26 (1987), pp. 73–87, esp. p. 78.  Toohey argues for (p. 78) “a dream ‘felt by’ a  
shadow”. 
14
 Homer, Odyssey, 10, 492.
15
 Homer,  Odyssey, 10, 495.  Toohey also shows that the reference to  σκιά has a parallel in Homer 
(although he attributes the possession of ‘wits’ in the underworld to Teiresias and not, more correctly,  
to  Persephone).   Toohey indicates other  places  where  σκιά is  used in  this  sense of  ‘shade’.   Cf. 
Aeschylus, Seven Against Thebes, 986–988.
16
 This was the bargain (Olympian) Hermes made with (the underworld god) Hades.
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my memories. This is, as Pindar says, to have only my dreams for company. The 
momentary day will decide the dream that is had for the stretch of eternity that is 
death.
The  encounter  between  Odysseus  and  the  fluttering  σκιαί,  the  souls  and 
shades of Hades, occupies much of Book 11 of the Odyssey.  The figures of Hades 
both are, and really, they are not. Achilles, who figures greatly in these passages, 
refers to them as βροτῶν εἴδωλα καμόντων. How are we to understand this phrase? 
A κημός is a muzzle or cloth, used to bridle a horse, or to protect the mouth and nose 
from the heat of the oven in a bakery: it is, therefore, a limiting covering, or a veil, 
that inhibits the proper use of the mouth. The proper use of the mouth is not only, or 
even primarily, for eating, nor even for breathing (and the dead can neither eat nor 
breath),  but  before  this  and  above  all,  the  mouth  is  for  speaking  –  λόγος, 
διαλέγεσθαι. The organ of speech is properly both the mouth and νοῦς, what we now 
speak of as mind,  or better  put,  openness of understanding. The  βροτῶν εἴδωλα 
καμόντων of which Homer speaks are therefore the images, or semblances (εἴδωλα) 
of mortals, but mortals who are muffled, restrained at the mouth, and so with respect 
to what they can say (with respect to speaking, λόγος), whose power of knowing and 
denoting what they know is in evanescence. Not speechless entirely, but wreathed 
with only ghostly words, the vague and elusive language of dreams.
Pindar in these two lines names the whole of a life: the whole is that which 
had life in the world and could open world for itself and others, and the ‘life’ that 
follows in death, in the house of Hades, when mortals still are, and yet really are not.  
The proper word for this whole life is  ψυχή, soul. Pindar names the measure of a 
whole life  that  is  a  soul,  ψυχή.  The last  word  that  Pindar  uses of  a  human life, 
however, is not ψυχή, but ἀιῶν, the ‘sweetly-seeming life  (μείλιχος αἰών)’ of which 
he speaks in the passage we have been considering, which is bright with a luminosity 
given by Zeus, and at the same time, itself Zeus-given (διόσδοτος), the best kind of 
life: the life in a full measure that Aristomenes’ victory at the games both makes 
possible (for himself) and merits.  
In his  De Cælo, Aristotle says that the word  αἰών was a divinely inspired 
name for the soul, given by our predecessors: Aristotle, therefore, explicitly returns 
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us to the previous (poetic) tradition to understand what this word means. Aristotle 
says that “indeed the ‘all’ as the extremity of the time of each living being, which 
according to its nature cannot be exceeded, is the surrounding αἰών of each being”.17 
He adds, “according to the same thought, the all of the heavens and all time and the 
unlimited final containment is  αἰών, taking the name from  ἀεί εἶναι (being ever), 
without death, and divine”.18 Aristotle provides us with an unwitting commentary on 
these lines of Pindar, for he tells us how to understand the term αἰών, and he tells us 
how to relate the being of the individual soul to the being of the cosmos as a whole: 
they are related in the measure of their time,  αἰών. Even in death, ever-being-the-
same. We glimpse from whence the doctrine of the  ἀρετή, the so-called virtues as 
the ‘perfecting’ of the ‘eternal’ soul, could stem.  The excellences (‘virtues’) of life 
are to be attained for the sake of what they will allot to us in the shaded dream-world, 
the memories, that will constitute the focus of our days at Hades.
In  contrast  to  contemporary philosophy,  neither  Aristotle  nor  Pindar  need 
thematise  ontology  (being  as  such,  my being)  through  being-as-a-whole 
(metaphysical  anthropology)  in  a  metaphysical  understanding  of  ontological 
difference: the being that I am belongs to being by its being bound together not in a 
metaphysical unity (the concept), but in the measure of time, which is in each case 
the same. The αἰών is at the same time the ψυχή, the soul, of every thing that lives, 
and the soul’s apportionment to eternity itself and within the whole of the cosmos. 
There is, in other words, also no attempt to define the essence of the creature with 
respect to itself, as every metaphysical anthropology does: rather the essence of the 
creature  is  both  read  off  from,  and  only from,  and  understood  within,  and  only 
within, the entirety of the heavens and the whole of time.  There is no prior ‘subject’, 
no ‘essence of man’, to be found in Aristotle or Pindar.
It is from here that we can understand how to read these lines of Pindar. For 
they stretch beyond the heavens, and beyond the natural time of each living being, 
but in a particular and most definite way. These lines begin with the day that befalls 
17
 Aristotle, De cælo, 279 a 24 f.  τὸ γὰρ  τέλοςτὸ  περιέχοντὸν τῆς ῾καστου ζωῆς , χρόνουοὗ μηθὲν 
ἔξω κατὰ  φύσιναἰών ἑκάστου .κέκληται
18
 Aristotle, De cælo, 279 a 25 f.  κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ  λόγονκαὶ τὸ τοῦ παντὸς οὐρανοῦ  τέλοςκαὶ 
τὸν   πάνταχρόνονκαὶ τὴν ἀπείραν   περιέχοντέλοςαἰων ἐστιν,  ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀεὶ εἶναι αἰληφώς τὴν 
ἐπωνυμίαν, ἀθάνατος καὶ θεῖος.
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us, and end with the entirety that both contains us and sets us forth. However the 
entirety is read right into eternity, into where we will spend almost all of the eternity 
which befalls us: the house of Hades itself. The day that makes me is the highest and 
most resplendent dream that my shade may have.  How is this day to be?  Is it the 
day of the character of Aristomenes, the best of days belonging to that one named 
best of courage, or is it the ignominious day of his defeated opponents?  Here only 
the fates will decide, abetted by the gods – it is the fates, abetted by Zeus as the 
highest god and therefore that one from whom the greatest light would fall, who will  
decide the fate of the mortal’s day. It is the day which decides how eternity will stand 
for me, and not the other way round.  The day of a mortal, a day god-given, given in 
the light of a god, that will be an eternal consolation (should such a day be granted).
I do not here want to read any kind of theology into these lines of Pindar: 
quite the reverse. Zeus is not a figure of the Christian God (the Father). Rather, we 
must recall the presence of Achilles, as both that one whom Odysseus goes into the 
house of Hades to meet, and whose name is placed as the very last word of the ode.  
Achilles does not terminate the ode by any accident.  Achilles is that one whose fate 
was promised as one of two possibilities: either he should have a short life, but to 
stand in memory as glorious for every following generation, or he should enjoy long 
life but ignominy thereafter.  Should he chose long life he must withstand that he will 
be forgotten by future generations (his shade will persist at Hades, unknown to others 
who  live).  The  whole  of  Pindar’s  Eighth  Pythian  recalls  and  repeats  (without 
naming)  this  founding  myth  of  the  life  and  reputation  among  men  of  the  hero 
Achilles. The young Achilles, when he goes out to avenge the death of his beloved 
Patroclus therefore both  knows his fate and  must make for himself the fate that he  
knows  is  to  be  his.  Glorious  in  all  subsequent  generations  of  men,  never  to  be 
forgotten, of highest fame, assured to him in the dream in death that is his evermore. 
Visited by Odysseus, now dead and here in Hades, so Homer tells us, the ‘peerless’ 
Achilles appears to Odysseus as one who weeps.19  Achilles is, in this ode and for 
Pindar, in every sense, Aristomenes: best of courageous men on the field of battle.
19
 Cf. Homer, Odyssey, 11, 472.  ἀμύμονα . . . ὀλοθύρομένη
Philia&Filia, Porto Alegre, vol. 02, n° 1, jan./jul. 2013
A Tradução Poética em Múltiplas Dimensões
56
______
The Rule for the 
Best: The End of  
Anthropology
Laurence Paul 
Hemming
ISSN 2178-1737
Yet this is not a contentless knowledge. The dream of a shade is the content 
of the day, the making of the man.  The peerless Achilles, best of men, knows who 
he is, and he is the greatest of men, and this will now never change in eternal death. 
Of all men, a glorious light attends him (λαμπὸν φέγγος ἔπεστιν ἀνδρῶν).  And yet 
he weeps.
One word we have left so far untranslated in Pindar’s lines: ἄνθρωπος. The 
shade that dreams is named:  ἄνθρωπος.  In these three poetic words  σκιᾶς ὄναρ, 
ἄνθρωπος,  a  sentence on its own,  both shade and  ἄνθρωπος are subjects,  in the 
nominative case. Mortals are those bound to the day, to whom the day is their lot.  It  
falls as glory or ignominy. In glory is a honey-sweet αἰών, which means, the whole 
of your time, both here and beyond the grave, will be decided in the day which is 
your measure.  And yet the decision is yours: each man, each woman, each mortal 
must make of the day his and her respective fate. This is not anthropology ex humani  
genere but its very reverse: you, yourself, and only you, are both bound to the fate 
that befalls you, and this day must be the making of your fate. The word ἄνθρωπος is 
almost always translated in these lines as man; man as such:  ‘humanity’. It should 
and must be translated as a man, even as it also says a woman. The fates of men and 
women are always singular and particular, belonging to each of us: is always mine, 
and yet, as we can see so strongly implied in the commentary supplied by Aristotle, 
this  singular destiny is  taken off from beings as a  whole,  from the whole of the 
heavens,  the  οὐρανός.  My fate  befalls  me as one among others,  and so my fate 
unfolds before you, before them. My particularity, the essence that is mine, can never 
be taken off without cognisance of, nor without respect to, you, you in general, the 
rest of mortals.  In Pindar, in Greek thought prior to the ‘what’ question of Plato and 
Aristotle, we do not look to define the ‘essence’ of humanity in terms of what is 
‘common’ (κοινόν) to all, but rather the reverse: we ask ‘who?’: who is that  one? 
The essence of a mortal being is  his or her respective,  absolute,  specificity.  The 
essence of a man is the man he comes to be (as final being-always in death) and so 
has once (in his day) been.  He and she knows this only in death: this is his dream, 
when my life folds back on me but cannot change again.  In death alone, and at 
Hades, I find myself in constant presence to myself.  Unlike the constant presence of 
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subjectivity, which has no content but is a mere empty thought – ‘I am’, this constant 
presence contains in its memory and fixedness the fulness of my finished life.
Pindar indicates to us, prisoners of the Cartesian cogito, how the Greeks were 
able  to  speak  of  an  ἄνθρωπος without  an  already-present  ‘anthropology’.  The 
essence, the being, of the ἄνθρωπος is only the finished, fulfilled βίος, the life of this 
specific man, woman, before us in each case, in death.  There is nothing antecedent, 
no pre-defined essence, that is not substantially derived from the world in which a 
man  arises,  and lives,  and has  his  day.  How then  from this,  the  sharpest  of  all 
individuations,  can this be a  politics?  The last  three lines of the Eighth Pythian 
switch, from the ἄνθρωπος to the πόλις – the city, the tribe, the nation.  Not the πόλις 
in general, ‘as such’, to which there is also no preexistent essence, but the πόλις of 
Aigina.  Aristomenes, best of courageous men, the  ἄνθρωπος in question, has his 
being in the  πόλις as among its best: to whom also Zeus, King Aiakōs, Telamon, 
Peleus  and  Achilles  bear  their  witness,  in  Zeus,  best  of  gods,  all  best  of  men. 
Aristomenes’ triumph signifies that dear mother Aigina, κόμιζε, which means (as an 
imperative) must take care and is taking care of the πόλις, the city-life in question.20 
Already at line 70 we have learnt that the feast for Aristomenes has brought the 
goddess  Order  (Δίκα),  the  ordering-settling  of  δίκη ‘justice’  (if  we  accept  this 
translation) to the city. The attainments of the best of men: Achilles; Aristomenes; 
set the city at peace with itself and in harmony, which, Pindar says in the concluding 
lines,  sets  the  city  “on  a  journey  of  being-set-free”  (ἐλευθέρῳ στόλῳ).   The 
attainments of the best of men opens the honeyed-sweet life of freedom, not for a 
man, but in fact, and preeminently, for the πόλις entire.
It may have concerned you, therefore, that there is in my words an implicit 
attack on democracy and the doctrine of the state. My concern and attack, however, 
is against the metaphysical doctrine of the state, as much to be found in Hegel as it is  
in  Marx,  Nussbaum and  others,  itself  grounded  in  a  metaphysical  anthropology. 
Does Pindar shed light on this for us?  That the presence in the πόλις of the best of 
men is not the government, or rule (from ἄρχω, I rule), of excellent men, as a taking-
20
 For  a  discussion of  Pindar’s  use of  the  present  imperative,  κόμιζε,  and its  significance  in  the 
political situation of Aegina in relation to Athens see Ilja Leonard Pfeijffer, Pindar’s Eighth Pythian:  
The Relevance of the Historical Setting in Hermes, vol. 123 (1995), pp. 156–165, see esp. 164 f.
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power  and taking-command  of  the  desire  for  power  and  laying-hands  on  it  (the 
modern business of ‘politics’), but rather, that the appearance of excellent men, and 
now women, in the  πόλις sets it in harmony and lets it be well-ruled? Is therefore 
what is at issue ‘aristarchy’, not rule of and by the best (so that the minute a man  or 
woman becomes the best he and she is pressed into service as leaders, when in fact it 
is for his and her sake that leadership should rise up to being exercised – something 
that admits both that politics is a dirty business and that it must be ever encouraged 
to strive for the overcoming of its faults), but rather rule ordered to, and for the sake 
of the best. Rule so that what – or rather who – are the best of men and women may 
properly appear, and set the πόλις in harmony with itself and with its worst. The rule 
for the best is the rule for the sake of the unity, of the whole, of the  πόλις.  And 
should we perhaps heed these words as the basis for life in the πόλις rather than any 
politics derived from a metaphysically conceived anthropology? And would this not 
better be our hope, the measure of our day?
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